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HIV-Based Claims for Protection in the
U.S. and the U.K.
By RULY TAFZIL*
I tell you, you can do nothing. Have you not troubles enough of your
own? I tell you there are thousands such in Johannesburg. And were
your back as broad as heaven, and your purse full of gold, and did
your compassion reach from here to hell itself, there is nothing you
can do.'
I. Introduction
In its most basic terms, asylum and refugee law is about protection.
It is a response to the belief that persons who are threatened, who will
likely suffer great harm at no fault of their own, should be protected. It
is a belief that has manifested itself repeatedly throughout history, from
the cities of refuge established by Moses, 2 to the temple sanctuaries of
ancient Rome,3 to the international instruments of protection at work
today.
As the AIDS epidemic continues, this belief is being put to the test.
There is no question of whether this age-old belief applies to those who
suffer from HIV. Whether by targeted persecution on account of their
HIV status, or by the sad reality that much of the world lacks effective
HIV treatment, many who suffer from HIV today face a grisly,
undignified end; an end that could be avoided if such persons were
allowed to remain in the more fortunate parts of the world. Yet, the
fear of ever increasing numbers of potential immigrants combined with
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, May 2010.
Dear thanks to Professor Karen Musalo for her wisdom and passion for teaching, to
Kim Thuy Seelinger for her patience and warmth of heart, and to the Hastings
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1. ALAN PATON, CRY, THE BELOVED COUNTRY 100 (Scribner 1987) (1948).
2. See Numbers 35.
3. IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND CENTRAL
AMERICAN REFUGEES 126 (Paulist Press 1985).
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rapidly increasing health care costs pose great political and social
challenges for those who would seek protection from such undignified
ends.
In an attempt to hold the law accountable to the beliefs underlying
its purpose, this note strives to take an account of the state of HIV based
claims for protection in the United States and the United Kingdom.
Section II outlines the sources of asylum and refugee law and compares
each country's unique interpretation of common international
instruments. Section III looks at the specific application of those laws to
HIV based claims. Section IV offers closing remarks.
II. Sources of Asylum and Refugee Law
Asylum and refugee law has a rich and long history. Section A
below deals with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, comparing its application in the United States and the United
Kingdom. Sections B and C discuss the European Convention on
Human Rights and the European Union Qualification Directive,
respectively. Neither of these instruments apply to the United States
and so the discussion of their application is limited to the United
Kingdom. Section D briefly discusses the Convention Against Torture
and its respective application in both countries.
A. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967
Protocol
Contemporary refugee law is largely based on the United Nations
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Convention),
which established a definition of and specific protections for refugees in
the aftermath of World War II.4 The 1951 Convention defines a refugee
as a person who
[als a result of events occurring'before 1 January 1951 and owing to a
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country .... 5
In line with its purpose, the 1951 Convention included geographic
4. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees preamble, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
5. Id. art. 1.
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and temporal restrictions on the definition of refugees, limiting it to
persons affected by events which occurred in Europe before 1951.6
Persons satisfying this restricted definition are granted a range of
protections designed to shield them from further harm.7 However,
even though the 1951 Convention deals almost exclusively with the
rights of refugees in their new country of residence, no specific article
requires States to provide refugees with a legal right to remain.8 In
terms of immigration, refugees are granted only the right of non-
refoulement defined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention as follows:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.9
The 1951 Convention was later expanded through the 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol) which eliminated the
geographical and temporal restrictions of the 1951 Convention while
maintaining the same refugee definition and protections as the 1951
Convention.10
Neither the 1951 Convention nor the 1967 Protocol are self-
executing, which means that both are dependent on domestic legislation
to give them full effect. Though the Office of the United Nation High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) issues guidelines regarding the
proper application of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, these
6. Id. art. 1(B)(1).
7. Much of the 1951 Convention details how the rights afforded to refugees should
be equal to those of native citizens. Protection is also provided against punishment due
to illegal status. See id. arts 17-23, 31.
8. Whether the 1951 Convention requires Contracting States to provide legal status
to all refugees is debated. Article 12 states that "(t)he personal status of a refugee shall
be governed by the law of the country of his domicile," which indicates that legal status
to remain in a country would be dependent on domestic legislation. This is the
dominant interpretation. However, Article 31 prohibits Contracting States from
imposing penalties on refugees "on account of their illegal entry or presence," so long as
they were coming "from a territory where their life or freedom was threatened in the
sense of article 1," while Article 32 prohibits Contracting States from expelling any
refugee lawfully in their territory. Combined, Articles 31 and 32 suggest that refugees
who have entered illegally from a territory where their life or freedom would be
threatened should not be punished on account of their illegal entry, but treated as a
lawful refugee and therefore must not be expelled.
9. Id. art. 33.
10. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, entered into force Oct. 4, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
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guidelines are not always followed." The manner in which these
international instruments have been implemented by the United States
and the United Kingdom is discussed below.
1. The United States
The United States became a party to the 1967 Protocol on
November 1, 1968.12 Over a decade later, the United States enacted the
1980 Refugee Act with the legislative intent of bringing United States
immigration law into conformity with the obligations set forth in the
1967 Protocol.' 3 Specifically, the 1980 Refugee Act provides three
avenues of protection. Persons outside the United States may be invited
through an "Overseas Refugee Program," subject to quotas established
by the President.14 Persons already within the territory of the United
States may apply for "withholding of deportation" and "asylum." 15
a. Withholding
Withholding is based on the right of non-refoulement provided by
Article 33 of the 1951 Convention. A grant of withholding requires
three elements: (a) that the claimant's life or freedom would be
threatened if removed to his home country; (b) that the claimant is a
member of a protected group; and (c) that the threat suffered by the
claimant is on account of his or her membership in that protected
group. The controlling statute for withholding is 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3)
which states that:
[T]he Attorney General may not remove an alien to a country if the
Attorney General decides that the alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such a country on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 16
In determining whether the claimant's "life or freedom would be
threatened," the term "would be" has been interpreted in the United
States to be equivalent to a "more likely than not" standard, meaning a
11. See U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees [UNHCR], Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/Rev.1 Uan. 1992).
12. 19 U.S.T. 6224, T.I.A.S. 6577.
13. S. REP. No. 96-256, at 144 (1980); KAREN MUSALO ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY
74 (Carolina Academic Press 2007) (1997).
14. INA § 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1157 (2005). Due to the selective nature of the Overseas
Refugee Program, it is not covered in this note.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1996).
16. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (1996).
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greater than fifty percent chance that the harm will occur. 17 The term
"life or freedom" has been interpreted broadly to include social and
economic forms of persecution if sufficiently severe.18
In determining whether the claimant is a member of a protected
group, the enumerated categories of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, and political opinion serve as
the only protected grounds by which a claimant may claim
withholding. Race has been understood to be synonymous with ethnic
group, referring to any such grouping commonly referred to as "race." 19
Religion includes membership or practice of a particular religion as well
as atheism or agnosticism. 2° Nationality is understood to include
citizenship to a State as well as ethnic and linguistic groups that may
exist within a State. 21 Political opinion includes not only affiliation with
official political parties but personal and social beliefs as well; whether
an opinion is political is determined on a case by case basis.22
Of the enumerated groups, particular social group is both the most
complex and the most germane to HIV-related cases. It is also the only
group with the flexibility to adapt to the whims of present and future
persecutors. This has placed the "particular social group" on embattled
ground, as those seeking protection try to broaden the definition of
particular social groups while the government generally tries to restrict
it. A full analysis of the present debate over particular social group is
beyond the scope of this note. Generally, a particular social group is
understood to be based on characteristics that are "so fundamental to [a
group's] identities or consciences that it ought not be required to be
changed." 23
In determining whether the threat to the claimant is "on account
of" a protected ground, the courts have applied a two-part test; first,
that the claimant's membership in the protected group be the causal
17. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984).
18. See Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that
economic harm in the form of severe harassment, threats, and discrimination was
accepted as a threat to life and freedom, as well as persecution).
19. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 13, at 525-30.
20. Id. at 463-64.
21. Id. at 525-30.
22. See Osorio v. I.N.S., 18 F.3d 1017 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that political actions
regarding workers' rights constituted political opinion); Bolanos-Hernandez v. I.N.S.,
767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984) (accepting the desire to remain neutral amidst civil strife as
political opinion).
23. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 212 (BIA 1985) (overturned on other grounds).
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factor for the harm suffered; and second, that the persecutor's actions be
motivated by the claimant's membership in that same protected
group.24 In cases where the persecutor holds multiple motives for
harming the claimant, U.S. law requires that the protected ground be at
least one of the central reasons for the persecutor's actions.2 5
This two-part test severely limits the scope of harm that can be
used in a claim for withholding. For example, if an HIV-infected man is
beaten by a police officer, the man must prove that his HIV status was a
central reason for the beating. If the beating was motivated by
extortion, personal animus, or any other reason not based on a
protected ground, it does not satisfy the requirements of withholding.
It is worth noting that this persecutor's intent requirement is
unique to the United States. The UNHCR's guidelines regarding the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol do not require victims to deduce
the motivations of their persecutors. 26 Instead, the claimants must show
only that their membership in the protected group was a causal factor
in their persecution.27 As a result, the current U.S. interpretation of the
1967 Protocol is in conflict with the international norm. Given that the
legislative intent of the 1980 Refugee Act, which established
withholding, was to bring the United States into conformity with its
obligations under the 1967 Protocol, it is arguable that U.S. law should
be interpreted in a manner honoring that legislative intent. At present,
this is not the case.
A successful grant of withholding provides a mandatory but
limited form of relief. As noted above, the statute provides that the
Attorney General "may not" remove a claimant that qualifies for
protection. There is no discretion in the grant of withholding.
However, claimants granted withholding are only protected from being
returned to the specific country where their life or freedom would be
threatened. A claimant seeking safety from one country may be
granted withholding and subsequently deported to a different country.
b. Asylum
U.S. law currently requires three elements for asylum: (a) that the
claimant have a well-founded fear of persecution if removed to his
24. I.N.S. v. Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
25. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 303 (2005).
26. UNHCR, Handbook, supra note 11, 66.
27. Id.
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home country; (b) that the claimant is a member of a protected group;
and (c) that the claimant's past persecution or well-founded fear of
persecution be on account of his membership in that protected group.
When a claimant satisfies these three elements, the burden of proof
shifts to the government to show that the claimant should not be
granted asylum due to a fundamental change in circumstances or the
possibility of relocation within the claimant's home country. However,
even if a claimant satisfies the elements of asylum, and overcomes all
grounds of denial, asylum may still be denied in the exercise of
discretion.
In contrast to withholding, asylum is not based on any explicit
right provided by the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol. However,
the definition of persons who may claim asylum is clearly adopted from
the refugee definition provided by the 1951 Convention. Asylum is laid
out in 8 U.S.C. § 1158 which states that the Attorney General may grant
asylum to a claimant determined to be a "refugee." 28 The term
"refugee" is defined as follows:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself to the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.29
As noted above, asylum requires that the claimant have a "well-
founded" fear of persecution. The term "well-founded" has been
interpreted to mean a generally one in ten chance that the claimant will
suffer persecution.3 0 This "well-founded" fear of persecution can be
proven either by a showing of past persecution creating a presumption
of future persecution, or by showing evidence of future persecution
directly.
A showing of past persecution creates a presumption of future
28. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(A) (2009) ("The Secretary of Homeland Security or the
Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien who has applied for asylum in
accordance with the requirements and procedures established by the Secretary of
Homeland Security or the Attorney General under this section of the Secretary of
Homeland Security or the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee
within the meaning of section 1101 (a)(42)(A) of this title.").
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2009).
30. I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
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persecution.31 This presumption is not limited to the type of past
persecution suffered, but is specific to the protected ground the past
persecution was on account of.32 For example, if a claimant suffers past
persecution in the form of his family being killed on account of their
race, this past persecution creates a presumption that the claimant will
again be persecuted on account of his race. The claimant may not be
able to lose his family a second time, but that does not protect him from
other forms of persecution on account of his race.
Persecution takes on many forms - from physical to economic,
from social to political. The boundaries of what type or severity of
harm rises to the level of persecution is not set in stone, adapting to the
individual circumstances of a claimant's case. A full account of the
different types of persecution is again beyond the scope of this note.
However, a detailed account of the harms suffered in HIV-related cases
in the United States and whether they rise to the level of persecution is
presented in Section III-A below.
In regards to the protected grounds by which a claimant may claim
persecution, the grounds and their interpretation are identical to that of
withholding. Similarly, that the harm suffered by the claimant be "on
account of" a protected ground is also identical to that of withholding.
Though the U.S.'s interpretation may be in conflict with UN guidance
and international norms, it is consistent with itself.
Once a claimant has satisfied the three elements of asylum the
burden of proof shifts to the government to show that the claimant
should be denied asylum due to a fundamental change in
circumstances, or the possibility of relocation within the claimant's
home country.33 Both of these grounds for denial attack the claimant's
well-founded fear of future persecution, without which the claimant is
not eligible for asylum.34
Where a claimant's well-founded fear of persecution is based on
past persecution, but the reasons for which the claimant was persecuted
in the past are no longer present, the government may claim that a
31. Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2000).
32. Mohamed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 800-02 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that past
persecution of female genital mutilation on account of membership in particular social
group of young girls in her clan created a presumption of future persecution on account
of the same ground, and the likelihood that the claimant would suffer the exact same
form of persecution was irrelevant).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (c)(2)(A) (2009).
34. Id.
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fundamental change in the claimant's circumstances negates the
presumption of a current well-founded fear of persecution.35 For
example, if an HIV-positive claimant was severely beaten in the past by
police of his home county on account of his HIV status, that claimant
has suffered past persecution. That past persecution on account of the
claimant's HIV status creates a presumption that the claimant will be
persecuted in the future on account of his HIV status. However, if the
government can show that reform efforts are underway in an attempt to
curb unlawful police beatings, or that the general animus against HIV-
positive individuals has subsided in the claimant's home country, such
changes may constitute a fundamental change in circumstances that
negates the presumption that the claimant's past persecution is
indicative of future persecution.
Similarly, when a claimant's past persecution or well-founded fear
of future persecution is due to a localized threat, the government may
argue that relocation within the claimant's home country may avert the
threat and thus negate the claimant's fear of future persecution. For
example, if an HIV-positive claimant lives in a province in his country
where HIV-positive individuals are persecuted, but has the ability to
move to another province where HIV-positive individuals are not
persecuted, the government may argue that the claimant may relocate
within his country and need not be granted asylum.
However, even if all lawful requirements have been met and all
grounds of denial have been overcome, asylum may still be denied in
the exercise of discretion. As noted above, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 provides that
the Attorney General may provide relief for a person defined as a
refugee.
When granted, asylum provides a broad form of relief. A claimant
who is granted asylum is granted legal status to remain in the United
States and may later adjust his status to that of a lawful permanent
resident and subsequently to a U.S. citizen should he desire to do so. 3 6
Asylees are granted work authorization and may travel abroad with
consent of the Attorney General.37
35. Id.
36. 8 U.S.C § 1158(c) (2009).
37. Id.
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2. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is a party to both the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol. 38 All immigration matters in the U.K., including
asylum, are governed by the U.K. Immigration Rules which serve as the
implementing body of law for the U.K.'s commitments under the 1967
Protocol, as well as other international treaties.39 Similar to the United
States, the U.K. employs a two procedure system for claimants already
present in the U.K.: asylum and humanitarian protection.
a. Asylum
Asylum provides legal status to remain in the U.K. for any claimant
who has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. The U.K.'s requirements for asylum are set out in Rule 334 as
follows:
An asylum applicant will be granted asylum in the United Kingdom if
the Secretary of State is satisfied that:
(i) he is in the United Kingdom or has arrived at a port of entry in the
United Kingdom;
(ii) he is a refugee, as defined in regulation 2 of The Refugee or Person in
Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006;
(iii) there are no reasonable grounds for regarding him as a danger to
the security of the United Kingdom;
(iv) he does not, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, he does not[sicl constitute danger to the
community of the United Kingdom....4o
The Qualification Regulations referred to in section (ii) above
defines the term "refugee" using the definition laid out in the 1951
Convention,41 specifically that a refugee must have "a well-founded fear
38. The United Kingdom ratified the 1951 Convention on March 11, 1954 and
acceded to the 1967 Protocol on September 4, 1968. UNHCR Doc. "State Parties to the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol," Oct. 1, 2008,
available at http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html.
39. See generally UK Border Agency, Asylum Policy Instructions, http://www.ukba.
homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/
(last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
40. UK Border Agency, Immigration Rules, rule 334 (last amended Jan. 2010)
[hereinafter Immigration Rules], http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw
/immigrationlaw/immigrationrules/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2010) (emphasis added).
41. The Qualification Regulations define a refugee as "a person who falls within
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of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion...."42
Persecution may take the form of physical or mental violence, legal
or judicial discrimination, or prosecution or punishment when
disproportionate to the crime or applied in a discriminatory manner.43
Whatever its form, the persecution must be "sufficiently serious by its
nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of a basic human
right."44
Asylum in the U.K. also requires that the persecution suffered be
on account of the claimant's race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion. Similar to the U.S. the
categories of race, religion, nationality, and political opinion are
interpreted relatively plainly. Race is interpreted broadly to include
color, descent, or ethnicity. 45 Religion includes the belief and expression
of theistic, non-theistic, or atheistic beliefs.46 Nationality includes both
citizenship as well as cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity.47 Political
opinion includes official political affiliations as well as personal
opinions and beliefs related to those of persecutors.48
Also similar to the United States, the U.K.'s interpretation of
particular social group is relatively flexible compared to the other
protected grounds. Particular social groups are required to share
an innate characteristic, or a common background that cannot be
changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to
identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce
it, and that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country,
because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society. 49
Article 1(A) of the Geneva Convention," the Geneva Convention defined as the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol. The Refugee or Person in Need of International
Protection (Qualifications) Regulations 2006 § 2, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si
/si2006/20062525.htm.
42. 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 1. Notably, this definition is identical to that
of asylum in the U.S. However, asylum in the U.K. provides a greater degree of
protection than in the U.S. as it is a mandatory form of relief and not discretionary as it
is in the U.S.
43. Id. art. 5.
44. Id.
45. Id. art. 6(a).
46. Id. art. 6(b).
47. Id. art. 6(c).
48. Id. art. 6(f).
49. Id. art. 6(d).
2010]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
As a mandatory form of relief, asylum must be granted to all
claimants who satisfy the legal requirements for asylum.50 A grant of
asylum provides the claimant with a United Kingdom Residence Permit
(UKRP) valid for five years. 51
b. Humanitarian Protection
Humanitarian protection provides legal status to remain in the
U.K. for any claimant who has shown substantial grounds for believing
that the claimant would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if
removed. The U.K.'s requirements for humanitarian protection, laid out
in rule 339C of the Immigration Rules, states that,
A person will be granted humanitarian protection in the United
Kingdom if the Secretary of State is satisfied that:
(i) he is in the United Kingdom or has arrived at a port of entry in the
United Kingdom;
(ii) he does not qualify as a refugee as defined in regulation 2 of The
Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification)
Regulations 2006;
(iii) substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person
concerned, if he returned to the country of return, would face a real risk of
suffering serious harm and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; and
(iv) he is not excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection. 52
Notably, humanitarian protection does not require that the harm
suffered be on account of a protected ground. A claimant must only
show that they will suffer a "real risk of serious harm." This stands in
sharp contrast to both withholding and asylum in the United States,
and asylum in the U.K., where a claimant must be a member of a
protected group and show that the harm suffered was on account of
that protected group. However, despite this lower statutory burden it
would be incorrect to assume that humanitarian protection is more
easily obtained than asylum.
Humanitarian protection requires that a claimant will likely suffer
"serious harm." This term has been interpreted narrowly. The term
50. UK Border Agency, Immigration Rules, Rule 334 (Jan. 2010), available at http://
www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/immigrationlaw/immigrationrules/ (last
visited Feb. 20, 2010).
51. Id.
52. Id. rule 339(c) (emphasis added).
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"serious harm" is defined as,
" the death penalty or execution; or
" unlawful killing; or
" torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the
country of return; or
" serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by
reason of indiscriminate violence in
" situations of international or internal armed conflict.53
In regards to HIV related claims, the third enumerated category of
"torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," is the
most relevant. This language comes from Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, and is discussed in detail in section III(B)
below.
Humanitarian protection also requires that "substantial grounds"
be presented for believing that the harm will occur. The term
"substantial grounds" has been interpreted to be a "reasonable degree
of likelihood," the same as with asylum in the U.K.54 As with the grant
of asylum in the U.K., a grant of humanitarian protection provides a
UKRP valid for five years.55
B. European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was drafted
by the Council of Europe in 1950.56 The ECHR laid out a set of
fundamental human rights to be honored by all member states and
established the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to uphold
them.57 The ECtHR has jurisdiction over all member states, and may
hear individual cases by citizens of member states.5 8 However, even
53. Id. (emphasis added).
54. UK Border Agency, Asylum Policy Instructions, Humanitarian Protection, at 8,
available at http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw
./asylumpolicyinstructions/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
55. UK Border Agency Immigration Rules, Rule 339Q(i) (Jan. 2010), available at
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/immigrationlaw/immigrationrul
es/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
56. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b04.html [hereinafter "ECHR"].
57. Section I of the ECHR enumerates the rights and freedoms provided by the
ECHR, and Section II establishes the European Court of Human Rights to ensure
implementation.
58. ECHR, supra note 56, art. 34.
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though the judgments of the ECtHR are binding on the States and
individual parties involved, the judgments are not technically binding
on national courts.59 Indeed, the ECtHR itself does not consider its own
past judgments binding on its own present or future cases.60
Nevertheless, domestic immigration policies often follow ECtHR
caselaw. 61
In an effort "to give further effect to the rights and freedoms" 62
guaranteed by the ECHR, the U.K. passed the Human Rights Act of
1998 which makes it "unlawful for a public authority to act in a way
which is incompatible with a Convention right." 63 Practically speaking,
this has meant that claimants who believe their deportations by the U.K.
Border Agency are incompatible with an ECHR right may bring suit in
the U.K.'s domestic courts, asserting their ECHR rights.
Similarly, the U.K.'s internal guidance on asylum and
humanitarian protection often cites to doctrines affirmed by ECtHR
cases as the appropriate standard for deciding claims.64 General asylum
policy guidance, as well as specific guidance on the ECHR, and
humanitarian protection cite directly to standards laid out in cases from
the ECtHR as well as from the House of Lords.65
C. European Union Qualification Directive
The Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the
qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and
the content of the protection granted (Qualification Directive) was
enacted by the European Union in 200466 as part of a process to establish
59. Id. art. 46 (stating that final judgments of the Court are binding on member
States).
60. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5856/72, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 12 (1978),
(stating that the ECHR is a "living instrument which must be interpreted in light of
present day conditions"), available at http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/
JUR2000/h06/undervisningsmateriale/Tyrer.doc. (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
61. UK Border Agency, Asylum Policy Instructions, Asylum Policy Instructions
October 2006 (re-branded December 2008) ECHR, 6, available at http://www.ukba.
homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/
(listed as "ECHR - European Convention on Human Rights") (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
62. Human Rights Act, 1998, preamble (Eng.), available at www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/
acts 1998/ukpga19980042en1.
63. Id. § 6(1).
64. Asylum Policy Instructions, supra note 61, at 5.
65. Id.
66. Council Directive 2004/83, 2004 O.J. (L 304) (EU), available at http://www.unhcr
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a Common European Asylum System.67 The Qualification Directive
created a common refugee definition and established a form of
subsidiary protection distinct from refugee status.68 Persons are eligible
for subsidiary protection if, "substantial grounds have been shown for
believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of
origin ... would face a real risk of suffering serious harm."69 "Serious
harm" is defined as:
(a) death penalty or execution; or
(b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an
applicant in the country of origin; or
(c) serious and individualized threat to a civilians life or person by
reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or
internal armed conflict. 70
In large part, subsidiary protection was very similar to
humanitarian protection that already existed in the U.K. The most
notable difference was the inclusion of victims of armed conflict, which
was added to the definition of "serious harm" for humanitarian
protection in 2006.71 The U.K.'s immigration rules as described above
are currently accepted as in compliance with the Qualification
Directive.72
D. Convention Against Torture
The United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) requires states
to "prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction," and
forbids states from returning "a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture." 73 Article 1 of the CAT defines torture as follows:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
.org/refworld/docid/4157e75e4.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
67. Humanitarian Protection, supra note 54, at 7.
68. Human Rights Act, supra note 62, chs. II, III, V, VI.
69. Id. ch. I, art. 2, § e.
70. Id. ch. V, art. 15.
71. Statement of changes in Immigration Rules, Rule 339C, (Oct. 2006), available at
http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm69/6918/6918.pdf.
72. Humanitarian Protection, supra note 54.
73. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment arts. 2.1, 3.1, entered into force June 26, 1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter "CAT"].
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mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.74
As emphasized in the text, harmful acts are only considered torture
if they are carried out at the instigation or acquiescence of a public
official or person acting in an official capacity. Though often the harm
suffered by claimants seeking asylum is perpetrated by public officials
such as police officers or members of the military, this is certainly not
always the case. The public official restriction of CAT significantly
limits it use. ¢
Article 3 of the CAT states that,
No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.75
Similar to the principal of non-refoulement in the 1951 Convention,
Article 3 of the CAT also prohibits the return of a person to a country
where they may be harmed, in this case where there are substantial
grounds that the person would be subjected to torture.
1. The United States
The United States ratified CAT in 1994 and in 1998 enacted the
Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA) to
implement its obligations under CAT.76 The result was a two part
system consisting of CAT withholding and CAT deferral.77
CAT withholding applies to claimants who satisfy the legal
requirements for CAT protection and are not subject to any limiting
exceptions, such as being a past persecutor of others or having been
previously convicted of a serious crime.78 Much like withholding under
74. Id. art. 1 (emphasis added).
75. Id. art. 3.1.
76. The Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
112 Stat. 2681-761 (1998).
77. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c), 208.17 (2009).
78. A full list of limitations is found in INA § 241(b)(3)(B).
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the 1980 Refugee Act, CAT withholding only guarantees that the
claimant will not be returned to the country where they may be
tortured. However, claimants granted CAT withholding may be
released from detention while in the United States and may obtain
employment authorization.79
CAT deferral applies to claimants who satisfy the legal
requirements for CAT protection but are subject to a limiting exception
as described above. Claimants granted CAT deferral are still prohibited
from being returned to the country where they may face torture, but
their status is easily terminated and often persons are kept in detention
while in the United States.80
2. The United Kindgom
The United Kingdom became a party to CAT in 1998. However,
nothing in the text of the Immigration Rules or in the UK Home Office's
policy guidelines refer to CAT specifically. This may be due to the
presence of Article 3 of the ECHR which has a strong presence in the
Immigration Rules and offers protection that encompasses that of CAT.
While CAT offers non-refoulement protection for a limited definition of
torture, Article 3 of the ECHR offers absolute protection for a much
broader range of harms.
III. Treatment of Claims for Protection Based on HIV Status
The treatment of HIV-related claims varies greatly between the
United States and the United Kingdom. Broadly speaking, HIV is
treated in the United States as a normal particular social group under
asylum law. Claims based on HIV alone are uncommon; likely because
persecution on account of an HIV-based protected ground alone is rare
and difficult to prove. More often HIV is used as part of a more
complex protected ground and serves to bolster the overall claim. For
example, HIV status can be used to show that a particular harm
suffered was especially severe due to HIV-related medical
complications, or that HIV status makes relocation impossible due to
medical needs.
In contrast, HIV claims in the U.K. were found to be exclusively
claims for humanitarian protection based on Article 3 of the ECHR,
which prohibits "torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
79. MUSALO ET AL., supra note 13, at 350.
80. 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(c) (2009).
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punishment."81  Claims are not based on any kind of targeted
persecution but solely on humanitarian grounds; that the removal of a
claimant suffering from advanced AIDS to a country lacking in
treatment or family support may constitute a breach of Article 3 of the
ECHR. However, the humanitarian bar for these cases seems to have
risen impossibly high as a claimant must be in a near death state to
qualify for protection. Claimants who were at a near death state, but
have since stabilized their condition due to medical care in the U.K., are
no longer protected and may be deported.
A. The United States
In analyzing U.S. caselaw regarding HIV-related asylum claims,
this note takes into account decisions from all levels of the asylum
process, from the asylum office to the federal courts. General accounts
of initial asylum office interviews were made available by the Center for
Gender and Refugee Studies (CGRS) at Hastings College of the Law. 82
CGRS maintains a database of case records made up of voluntary
submissions by innigration attorneys. Claimants denied relief at the
asylum office stage are offered a hearing before an Immigration Judge.
Three accounts of Immigration Judge (IJ) rulings were found through
Interpreter Releases, a reputable journal covering immigration law.
Claimants denied relief by the IJ may appeal their cases to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). Three such cases were found through
Westlaw and LexisNexis databases. BIA cases may be appealed to the
federal court system. Twenty-five federal cases dealing with HIV-
related asylum, withholding, and, or CAT claims were found through
researching Westlaw and LexisNexis databases.
For the purpose of analysis this note breaks down HIV-related
asylum claims into two broad categories: those where the persecution
suffered was on account of HIV status, and those where persecution
was suffered on account of an alternate or mixed protected ground.
This distinction is made due to the marked difference in the forms of
persecution suffered by each group. Cases involving persecution on
81. ECHR, supra note 56, art. 3.
82. From the CGRS databases, 63 cases involved asylum seekers who were
identified as HIV-positive. This includes active cases as well as cases still in strategy
and planning phases. Out of these 63, 24 involved HIV-based claims which were
resolved or currently pending, 11 articulated an intent to use HIV-based claims but their
status was unknown. The remaining 28 cases which involved HIV-positive asylum
seekers did not include HIV-based claims. For the purposes of this analysis, only the 24
which involved HIV-based claims and whose current status is known were considered.
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account of HIV status were characterized predominantly by claims of
inadequate medical care, with claims of discrimination, physical harm
and detention also present. Cases involving a broader protected
ground, however, largely discarded claims based in inadequate medical
care, preferring to focus on their stronger claims of rape, sexual assault,
and physical harm. Table 1 below details the number of cases found in
each group and the types of persecution suffered. A discussion of each
group is found below with a more detailed analysis of representative
cases following each section.
Table 1.
Forms of Persecution
Suffered
-slm Imgain I" Fdrl srOfc- jde ors,(/ fttl
Total Number of Cases
Cases which presented claim of persecution as
described on left. Note that many cases involve
multiple claims so totals from these sections may
exceed total number of cases shown above.
Cases Involving
Persecution on account of 7 1 3 9 20
HIV Status
Inadequate Medical Care 7 1 3 6 17(85%)
Employment/Medical Care 1 1 2 3 7 (35%)
Discrimination
Physical Harm/Detention 2 0 1 3 6 (30%)
Cases Involving
Persecution on account of 17 2 0 16 37
Other Protected Ground
Inadequate Medical Care 2 1 0 2 5 (14%)
Employment/Medical Care 0 0 0 2 2 (5%)
Discrimination
Physical Harm/Detention 11 2 0 14 27 (73%)
Rape/Sexual Assault 8 4 0 3 15 (40%)
Total 24 3 3 25 57
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1. Cases Involving Persecution on Account of HIV Status
Cases where HIV status alone was the primary characteristic of the
asylum seeker were invariably articulated as particular social group
claims, where HIV status was the identifying characteristic of their
particular social group. HIV status has been accepted as a basis for
particular social group, but recent changes to the requirements of
particular social group bring uncertainty to the matter.8 7 Historically,
however, the difficulty with such cases has been in proving harm rising
to the level of persecution on account of a particular social group based
only on HIV status.88 Persecution in such cases was limited to general
conditions of inadequate medical care, medical care and employment
discrimination, and detention.89 A successful grant of protection in any
of these cases was rare.
Most common were claims arguing that general conditions of
inadequate medical care constituted a "death sentence" for HIV
suffering asylum seekers, thus arising to the level of persecution.90 A
lack of supporting evidence specific to the asylum seeker's own
83. Cases are pulled from the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies (CGRS)
database. Cases will be referred to based on their CGRS file number.
84. Cases are referenced from accounts published in Interpreter Releases. Cases are
cited based on case number where available as well as Interpreter Releases issue.
85. Cases found through search on Westlaw and LexisNexis.
86. Id.
87. See 73 Interpreter Releases 26 at 909 (INS Office of General Counsel issued a memo
stating that "in certain circumstances ... persons with HIV or AIDS may constitute a
particular social group under refugee law"); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1168
(9th Cir. 2005) (writing that "the INS recognized that in certain circumstances ...
persons with HIV or AIDS may constitute a particular social group under refugee law");
Jean-Pierre v. Atty. Gen., 500 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2007) (referencing Karouni as well as
the INS memo in noting that the government has recognized that HIV/AIDS may
constitute a valid particular social group); Interview with Arwen Swink, Immigration
Attorney, The Law Office of Robert B. Jobe (Jan. 5, 2009). But see Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008) (finding that youths who have resisted gang recruitment
did not satisfy the social visibility test of particular social group); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 591, 594 (B.I.A. 2008) (finding that "persons resistant to gang membership"
lacked the social visibility required for particular social group).
88. Interview Victoria Neilson, Legal Director, Immigration Equality (Mar. 2, 2009),
Interview Arwen Swink, Attorney, The Law Office of Robert B. Jobe (Jan. 5, 2009).
89. See Table 1.
90. See Bosede v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 946 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating that "(i)n short,
Bosede argued that a return to Nigeria was akin to a death sentence"); Gebremaria v.
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 734, 736 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that "Gebremaria claimed that
because of her Human Immunodeficiency Virus status she 'would face a death
sentence' if she were forced to return to Ethiopia").
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potential treatment, or lack of treatment, was fatal. 91 However, even
with ample evidence showing a personal lack of medical care on the
part of claimant, the great majority of these claims failed due to a lack of
nexus.92 Though the harm suffered as a result of generally poor medical
conditions may be quite severe for someone HIV positive, the harm is
not targeted at any individual - let alone a protected group under
asylum law - and thus does not satisfy the legal requirements of
asylum, withholding, or the definition for torture required under CAT.
Despite this shaky legal footing, however, there is some evidence that
claims of generally inadequate medical care have been successful. 93
Some lower level accounts suggest that a sympathetic story may
sometimes find favor with an understanding judge.94
More successful were cases involving discrimination on account of
HIV status. These cases argue that a denial of employment and, or
medical care on account of HIV status will deny the asylum seeker life-
saving medical treatment leading to suffering and death thus rising to
the level of persecution.95  A clear connection between the
discrimination and the suffering and loss of life that will result is crucial
as mere discrimination such as the loss of a job does not rise to the level
of persecution.96 Similarly, the existence of anti-discriminatory laws,
even if they are only sporadically if at all enforced, may undermine the
perceived breadth of discrimination preventing a court from finding
persecution.97  Without official government policy clearly
91. Calle v. Att'y. Gen., 264 F.App'x. 882 (11th Cir. 2008) (writing that a homosexual
HIV-positive man from Argentina argued that "hospitals in Argentina did not have his
medication," though he later "admitted that he did not have any evidence that he
would be unable to receive treatment," and was denied relief).
92. Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 651, 652 (8th Cir. 2007) (writing that Morales,
a homosexual HIV-positive man from Mexico was denied asylum because he "did not
establish that the lack of care was an attempt to persecute homosexuals or those with
HIV").
93. See Matter of-, reported in 78 Interpreter Releases 3 at 233; Matter of-, reported in
73 Interpreter Releases 26 at 901.
94. See id.; Interview with Victoria Neilson, Legal Director, Immigration Equality
(Mar. 2, 2009).
95. See Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2005); In Re Argueta, 2003
WL 23521910 (BIA 2003).
96. Torres v. Att'y Gen., 269 F.App'x 190, 191, 2008 WL 683930 (3d Cir. 2008)
(unpublished decision) (involving a homosexual HIV-positive man from Colombia was
fired due to homosexuality, and holding that the firing constituted harassment and
discrimination, but not persecution).
97. Paredes v. Att'y. Gen., 219 F.App'x 879 (11th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-13944).
Homosexual HIV-positive man from Venezuela argued that he "would be denied
2010]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
discriminating against HIV status, persons making these claims become
dependent on the existence of widespread social animus against HIV.
To prove such widespread social animus up-to-date country condition
reports are essential.98  Where there is clearly widespread
discrimination, whether due to government policy or social animus
against HIV status, the courts have held that such discrimination may
exacerbate existing persecution and render relocation unreasonable.99
Least common were cases involving detention on account of HIV
status. These cases involve the detention of HIV-positive persons,
whether by official government policy or by the actions of government
actors.100 It is uncertain exactly how long or severe an asylum seeker's
detention must be to rise to the level of persecution; a few hours is
clearly too short, a few years is more than sufficient.1 01 One key factor
seems to be whether the asylum seeker had reason to fear for their long
term freedom and safety; if an asylum seeker knows they are only being
held for a few days it is not persecution, but if their detention is
potentially indefinite it may be persecution even if the actual length of
medical treatment because he had HIV." Id. 2. Provided expert testimony that "most
employers in Venezuela participated in unauthorized HIV tests prior to offering
employment and, if an individual tested positive for HIV, the employer would likely
not give a job offer. Reyna stated that health care providers also discriminated against
gay men and that, even though such discrimination was against the law, the
government did not prosecute the discriminators." Id. 10. However, the court held
that "Paredes' fear of employment discrimination did not rise to the level of persecution
where the Venezuelan government had made it illegal to engage in blood tests as a
condition of employment but some individual employers still required blood tests." Id.
16.
98. In Re Argueta, 2003 WL 23521910 (involving HIV-positive man from Honduras
who argued that "there is such pervasive and severe discrimination against AIDS
patients, including denial of employment, that it amounts to persecution," but six of
fourteen supporting documents were over four years old, leading the adjudicator to
find there was insufficient evidence as to the current state of discrimination in
Honduras).
99. Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1168 (holding that Karouni's HIV/AIDS status would force
him to reveal his homosexuality if returned to Lebanon, thus subjecting him to anti-
homosexual persecution); Boer-Sedano, 418 F.3d 1082 (holding that Boer-Sedano's
inability to obtain medical treatment in Mexico due to employment and medical care
discrimination against HIV-positive persons rendered relocation anywhere in Mexico
unreasonable).
100. See generally, Karouni, 399 F.3d 1163, Bosede, 512 F.3d 946.
101. Torres, 269 F.App'x 190 (explaining that a homosexual HIV-positive man from
Colombia was detained after a police raid on a discotheque, and the court held that
customary police detention may constitute harassment, but does not rise to the level of
persecution).
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detention was relatively short.102
a. Paredes v. Attorney General
Paredes v. Attorney General illustrates the difficulty in proving
persecution for the types of harm suffered on account of HIV status.
Paredes provided ample evidence of employment and medical care
discrimination against men with HIV, showing that in all likelihood
Paredes would not be able to obtain the medication he needed to
survive if deported back to Venezuela. However, in Paredes' case the
existence of government laws outlawing such discrimination made it
extremely difficult to prove that the government was unwilling or
unable to protect Paredes, as is required under asylum law. In the
battle over establishing the real country conditions of Venezuela, the
court favored Venezuela's formal anti-discrimination laws over the
testimony of aid workers on the ground describing the discrimination
their clients experienced in their daily lives. It is uncertain what
evidence would have persuaded the court to acknowledge a pattern
and practice of discrimination against homosexuals with HIV in
Venezuela, despite laws to the contrary.
Paredes' case also illustrates the importance of connecting HIV-
based discrimination to the suffering and death an HIV positive person
will experience if unable to secure medical treatment. In this case the
court quickly dismissed Paredes' claims of employment and medical
care discrimination, holding that "although discrimination is
reprehensible, it does not rise to the level of persecution." 103 To support
this holding, the court cites a previous case which held that "mere
harassment does not amount to persecution."104 However, while
discrimination in the form of not being hired for a job is arguably
similar to harassment and therefore should not amount to persecution,
being denied medical treatment necessary to stay alive is arguably quite
different and should amount to persecution.
102. Bosede, 512 F.3d at 948-49 (explaining that a HIV-positive man returning to
Nigeria was detained at airport due to HIV positive status and was released only after
promising to stay at a specific hotel named by airport officials, but fearing for his safety,
the man fled the hotel and later bribed airport officials to reenter the United States).
103. Paredes, 219 F.App'x at 887.
104. Id. (citing Sepulveda v. Atty Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005)).
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Case Summary
Paredes v. Attorney General was an Eleventh Circuit case involving a
homosexual HIV positive man from Venezuela. 105 Paredes sought
asylum, withholding, and protection under CAT, arguing that he had a
well-founded fear of future persecution on account of his membership
in the particular social group of "homosexual men infected with
HIV."106 Paredes claimed future physical harm on account of his
homosexuality, and denial of employment and medical treatment on
account of his HIV positive status.107
An expert on HIV issues in Venezuela testified that Paredes would
be unable to obtain HIV medication in Venezuela for three main
reasons. 108  First, Paredes could only obtain treatment through
Venezuela's social security system if he had a job, and despite laws
prohibiting discriminatory behavior many employers still required
medical exams for employees and did not hire persons with HIV.109
Second, even if Paredes could qualify for social security, the system had
a preference for women and children which would result in the
exclusion of Paredes as a man.110 Third, Paredes would be unable to
qualify for private health insurance as private companies excluded
persons with HIV."' Paredes also introduced ample country conditions
evidence supporting the expert witness' testimony as well as
establishing general animosity against homosexuals in Venezuela. 112
The government argued that large demonstrations, such as the 2002
Venezuelan Gay Pride Celebration which included over 50,000
participants, undermined Parede's claim of a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of his homosexuality." 3 Additionally, a 2001
Venezuelan Supreme Court decision had ruled that all Venezuelans
with HIV were entitled to free treatment, and the right to work and live
privately, free from discrimination." 4
The IJ found Paredes' testimony credible and accepted Paredes'
105. Paredes, 219 F.App'x at 880.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 882.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 883.
114. Id.
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membership in the particular social group of homosexual men with
HIV.115 However, the IJ denied Paredes' claim for asylum, holding that
Paredes had supplied insufficient evidence that he himself would be
targeted for harm or discrimination on account of his homosexuality or
HIV status.116 The IJ noted that the Venezuelan government had taken
affirmative steps to fight against such discrimination, and that Paredes'
expert witness was not credible because his knowledge was derived
from the experiences of others shared with him in the course of his
work as a social worker in Venezuela.117 Finally, the IJ noted that
Paredes' repeated trips back and forth to Venezuela undermined his
claim of a fear of persecution if returned to Venezuela.11 8
The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, noting that Paredes had
provided evidence that homosexuals in Venezuela may suffer various
hardships, but that the evidence did not support a claim of a well-
founded fear of persecution.11 9
In his appeal to the federal court, Paredes abandoned his CAT
claim and argued that the IJ and BIA had erred on his asylum and
withholding claims on four grounds. First, the IJ had failed to use a
pattern and practice analysis when adjudicating his claim, instead
incorrectly focusing on specific acts of persecution. Second, even if the
IJ did use a pattern and practice analysis, the IJ erred in finding that
Paredes' evidence of harassment, discrimination, detention, and
beatings of homosexual HIV-positive men failed to establish a pattern
and practice of persecution. Third, the IJ relied on out-of-date
information regarding the policies of the Venezuelan government
concerning the treatment of homosexuals with HIV, specifically, that a
proposal advocating homosexual rights mentioned in the evidence was
in fact never enacted into law. Fourth, the IJ was incorrect in
discounting the testimony of Paredes' expert witness after already
accepting him as an expert witness.120
In regards to the first argument, the court held that the IJ and BIA
both used a pattern and practice analysis even if they did not mention it
by name.121 Determining whether or not Paredes would be singled out
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 884.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 886.
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for future discrimination, and whether the government either controlled
or sponsored such discrimination "reasonably relates to the question
of ... a pattern of practice of persecution."122
The court then stated that though Paredes introduced evidence of
discrimination, discrimination itself does not rise to the level of
persecution, either in terms of employment or medical care benefits.123
In light of the evidence concerning the government's attempts to outlaw
persecution against homosexuals with HIV, the court held that such
discrimination was not enough to warrant a reversal under the
substantial evidence standard.124
The court did not address Paredes' third argument explicitly, but
notes that even admitting the failure of the aforementioned proposal to
pass into law, other efforts by the government such as laws outlawing
discrimination against homosexuals with HIV effectively illustrated the
government's attempts to combat discrimination.125
In regards to Paredes' claim that his expert's testimony was
unfairly limited, the court held that the IJ's decision to limit the weight
of testimony is distinct from limiting the testimony.126 The weight given
to evidence is within the IJ's discretion. 27
For the reasons above, the court denied Paredes' claim for asylum,
and while noting that the evidentiary bar for withholding is greater
than that for asylum, denied Paredes' claim for withholding as well.128
b. Bosede v. Mukasey
Bosede serves as an example of the difficulty in proving harm on
account of HIV status. Fortunately for Bosede, he was granted remand
on due process grounds. Unfortunately, this leaves no holding relating
to Bosede's original claims. However, the tone and dicta of the case
seem to suggest that the court favorably considered Bosede's claims.
Though the court does not address each facet of Bosede's claim
individually, as a whole the court considers the totality of Bosede's
claim as consisting of "imprisonment, mistreatment, and possibly
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 888.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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death."129 These forms of harm are later categorized as "persecution or
torture."130 Though no holding relating to these facts is given, the court
seems to suggest that Bosede's detention and potential poor medical
care would rise to the level of persecution.
Case Summary
Bosede came to the United States legally in 1980, becoming a
permanent resident in 1982.131 Marrying a U.S. citizen, Bosede fathered
two children before being diagnosed with HIV in 1997.132 Due to
numerous conflicts with the law, however, in 2001 immigration
authorities sought to remove Bosede as an alien convicted of a drug
offense and an aggravated felony.133  Bosede sought asylum,
withholding, and protection under CAT, arguing that he would be
persecuted in Nigeria on account of his Christian religion and his HIV-
positive status.M
Before the IJ, Bosede testified that during a past visit to Nigeria in
1999, he was detained by airport authorities on account of his HIV
status when HIV medication was found in his luggage. 135 Bosede was
released only after he had agreed to stay at a hotel specified by the
airport authorities.136 Fearing for his safety, Bosede immediately left the
hotel and later bribed airport officials to return to the United States.137
Bosede also introduced testimony that under Nigerian law he
would be imprisoned immediately upon his return to Nigeria. Under
"Decree 33" any Nigerian citizen convicted of a drug crime abroad is
automatically sentenced to five-years imprisonment. 38 In combination
with this claim, Bosede argued that because of his HIV status, he would
suffer extreme hardship in a Nigerian prison. Bosede furnished
evidence that a lack of doctors, medication, and even basic nutrition
had led to high death rates for HIV-positive prisoners in Nigeria's
prisons.
129. Bosede, 512 F.3d at 951.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 948.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 949.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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For reasons unknown, Bosede abandoned his asylum claim by the
time his case went before the IJ, leaving only his claims for withholding
and protection under CAT. The IJ denied Bosede's claim for
withholding on the ground that Bosede's prior drug offenses were
presumed to be particularly serious crimes, which barred Bosede from
relief under withholding. Bosede's CAT claim was denied on the
ground that Bosede had not provided sufficient evidence to show that
he would likely be detained if returned to Nigeria.139 The IJ noted that
Bosede's fear of detention under Decree 33 was merely speculative and
that his prior ability to enter and leave the country by bribing airport
officials undermined his claim that he would be detained if removed to
Nigeria.140 The BIA subsequently affirmed.
In his appeal to the federal court, Bosede argued that the IJ erred as
a matter of law in characterizing his prior drug possession as a "drug
trafficking crime" as required by the statute under which he was being
deported. The court noted that usually it does not have jurisdiction to
second guess the BIA when it makes a discretionary decision such as
whether a prior crime was a "drug trafficking crime." However, the
court noted that it does reserve the right to determine whether there has
been a violation in due process. Here, the court held that the IJ's
treatment of Bosede's case violated Bosede's due process rights. A
finding that a crime was a "drug trafficking crime" is usually subject to
various "unusual circumstances" exceptions, such as the amount of
drugs involved, or the absence of any threat of violence. The court
noted that the IJ did not allow Bosede a chance to argue any of these
unusual circumstances despite evidence in the record suggesting that
many of them would have applied to Bosede.
The court went on to note a "cavalier attitude" by the IJ in regards
to Bosede's case and was:
appalled that the IJ would rest his decision on the absurd proposition
that Bosede could evade imprisonment, mistreatment, and possibly death
by approaching his jailers and trying to buy his way out .... We have
said before and underscore here that whether an alien might succeed
in escaping persecution or torture through bribery is an irrational and
altogether improper consideration in deciding a claim for asylum or
other relief." 141
Again, though not part of the holding of the case, this dicta seems
139. Id. at 950.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 952 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 33:2
HIV-Based Claims for Protection in the U.S. and the U.K.
to suggest that the judge viewed Bosede's claims of detention and
future poor medical care seriously, and considered them comparable to
persecution or torture. The court went on to hold that Bosede's due
process rights had been violated and remanded the case for a new
hearing with a different immigration judge.142
2. Cases Involving Persecution on Account of Other Protected Grounds
HIV status was most often used in cases as part of a more complex
protected ground, such as a particular social group of "homosexual
men infected with HIV," 143 or political opinions in favor of "bisexuals,
transsexuals, and people infected with HIV." 144 In most of these cases,
HIV status acts as an aggravating factor to the persecution suffered.
Though an asylum seeker's main claim may be persecution on account
of sexual orientation, HIV status may (a) impute the persecuted sexual
orientation making it impossible to avoid persecution; 145 (b) increase the
health risks of persecution due to medical complications;146 or (c)
highlight medical needs that render relocation unreasonable. 147
Persecution in these cases is much more varied as it is no longer on
account of HIV/AIDS status alone. Many of the cases involved
homosexual Latin American men who suffered harassment, detention,
discrimination, abandonment, beatings, rape, death threats and, or the
deaths of their friends on account of sexual orientation in their home
countries before fleeing to the United States and subsequently learning
of their HIV/AIDS status. 48 Such harms have a mixed record of
142. Id.
143. Paredes, 219 F.App'x at 880.
144. Rico v. U.S. Att'y. Gen., 154 F.App'x 875, 876 (11th Cir. 2005).
145. Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1168 (holding that Karouni's HIV/AIDS staus would impute
homosexuality if returned to Lebanon, thus subjecting him to persecution).
146. Jean-Pierre, 500 F.3d at 1315 (involving a Haitian HIV-positive man who suffered
from advanced HIV infection rapidly leading to mental illness, which he argued would
cause prison guards to target him for torture, but the IJ had held that generally poor
medical conditions do not constitute persecution, and the Court remanded, holding that
targeted torture due to HIV-caused mental illness was different from suffering caused
by generally poor conditions in Haitian prisons).
147. Boer-Sedano, 418 F.3d at 1082 (holding that Boer-Sedano's inability to obtain
medical treatment in Mexico due to employment and medical care discrimination
against HIV positive persons rendered relocation anywhere in Mexico unreasonable).
148. Paredes, 219 F.App'x at 879 (writing that a homosexual HIV-positive man from
Venezula testified to verbal harassment of other homosexuals, and the Court held that
verbal harassment does not rise to the level of persecution); Rocha v. Att'y. Gen., 253
F.App'x 167, 169 (3rd Cir. 2007) (involving a homosexual HIV-positive man from
Venezuela who was called a "whore" by police and was sexually assaulted with a gun,
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success in qualifying as persecution. Harassment rarely rises to the
level of persecution.149 Detention and discrimination may rise to the
level of persecution if it is severe enough to cause a genuine threat to
the life or freedom of the asylum seeker. 50 Abandonment, beatings,
rape, death threats and the actual threat of death all rise to the level of
persecution.151
a. Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler
Morales' case is representative of the majority of claims involving
HIV. There is a strong central claim to which a less developed HIV
based claim is added. In this case Morales' central claim was his past
persecution as a child on account of his homosexual behavior. In
addition to this, Morales' argued that generally poor medical conditions
in Mexico would amount to persecution due to his HIV-positive status
if removed. In this case, there was little integration between the main,
and secondary HIV-based claim. As noted above, this type of claim is
commonly raised in cases involving HIV-positive claimant and is
almost always rejected. A failure to show that the absence of treatment
was targeted at HIV-positive persons prevents the harm from being "on
account of" a protected ground.
Case Summary
Ixtlico-Morales v. Keisler involved a homosexual HIV-positive man
from Mexico who had been beaten by his father, mother, and bothers
since the age of nine for displaying homosexual behavior.15 2 At the age
of ten, Morales' father threw him out of the house saying he would
never accept a homosexual as a son.15 3 Twice Morale's attempted to
but the court held that harm was harassment and discrimination, but not persecution);
Ixtlilco-Morales, 507 F.3d at 651 (explaining that a homosexual HIV-positive man from
Mexico was beaten from the age of 9 by his father for his homosexual identity and was
later disowned by his family for maintaining homosexual identity, and the Court held
that beatings and abandonment of a child rose to the level of persecution); Boer-Sedano,
418 F.3d at 1082 (writing that a homosexual HIV-positive man from Mexico was
repeatedly raped and threatened with death by a police officer on account of sexual
orientation, and the Court held that beatings, rape, and verbal death threats each rise to
the level of persecution).
149. See Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir.1995) (explaining that in this
case, harassment and ostracism did not arise to the level of persecution).
150. See Paredes, 219 F.App'x at 879.
151. See Boer-Sedano, 418 F.3d at 1082.
152. Ixtlilco-Morales, 507 F.3d at 652.
153. Id.
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return to his family, and twice his family rejected him.154 At the age of
twelve Morales attempted to commit suicide.15 5 In 1994, when Morales
was seventeen years old, he entered the United States without
documentation and found his way to Minnesota where he was able to
live openly as a homosexual. 56 Morales was diagnosed with HIV in
2003, and soon after applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under CAT. 5 7 Morales argued past persecution on account
of his homosexuality, future persecution on account of his
homosexuality, as well as future persecution due to a lack of medical
care for his HIV status if removed to Mexico.
The Immigration Judge found Morale's testimony credible but
concluded that the past harm Morales suffered was not persecution
"because it was not inflicted by the government or by actors the
government was unable or unwilling to control." 58 The IJ held that
since Morales had failed to notify the police of his situation, he did not
establish that the government was unwilling to help.159 Morales
appealed his case to the BIA.160
The BIA disagreed with the IJ's holding concerning Morales' failure
to notify, noting that "[gliven Morales's young age at the time of the
abuse and evidence in the record showing that domestic abuse of
homosexual children is a significant problem in Mexico, [it is]
insignificant that Morales did not report the abuse."161 However,
though this past persecution now created a presumption of a well-
founded fear of future persecution for Morales, the BIA ruled that this
presumption was rebutted by a fundamental change in Morales'
circumstances. 162 Morales was no longer a child.163
As for Morales' claim that a lack of medical care for HIV/AIDS
would lead to persecution, the BIA held that "Morales did not establish
that the lack of care was an attempt to persecute homosexuals or those
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 653.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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with HIV."164 The BIA held that Morales was not eligible for asylum,
withholding, or protection under CAT.165
Morales appealed to the federal courts, arguing that the BIA was
incorrect in determining that age could constitute a fundamental change
in circumstances. 166 However, the federal court affirmed the BIA's
holdings and denied Morales' claims for withholding and protection
under CAT as well. 167
b. Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales
Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales illustrates how HIV-based claims can be
used to augment other claims for relief. Boer-Sedano's main claim was
one based on past persecution on account of his homosexuality. Once
established, the case turned on whether Boer-Sedano could be subject to
any of the rebuttals against the presumption of a well-founded fear that
flows out of a finding of past persecution. The main rebuttal used by
the government was that of reasonable relocation. If relocation had
been shown to be reasonable, then despite Boer-Sedano's established
past persecution the presumption that Boer-Sedano would again be
persecuted on account of his homosexuality would have been broken.
Boer-Sedano would have been forced to argue a well-founded fear of
future persecution based only on his country conditions evidence of the
treatment of homosexuals in Mexico.
In this regard, the use of Boer-Sedano's HIV status to show that
relocation within Mexico was unreasonable was a crucial element of
Boer-Sedano's case. The skillful combination of Boer-Sedano's HIV
status to show dire medical need, and employment discrimination on
account of homosexuality that would make that need impossible to
satisfy within Mexico, created an argument stronger than what either
HIV status or homosexuality on its own could support.
Case Summary
Boer-Sedano v. Gonzales was a Ninth Ciruit case involving a
homosexual man with HIV from Mexico.168 Boer-Sedano was born in
Tampico, a small city on the eastern coast overlooking the Gulf of
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 657.
168. Boer-Sedano, 418 F.3d at 1082.
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Mexico.1 69 From the age of seven Boer-Sedano knew that he was
homosexual. 170 Unfortunately, Boer-Sedano's family was unwilling to
accept a homosexual child.'71 Boer-Sedano was ostracized by his family
and friends, and kept away from relatives in fear that he would be a
"bad influence" on them.172
In 1988 Boer-Sedano was travelling by car with a friend when they
were stopped by a "high ranking police officer." 173 The officer arrested
and detained the men for twenty-four hours, telling them that they
were being held because they were homosexual, at which point Boer-
Sedano responded by saying that homosexuality was not a crime in
Mexico.17 4
Over the next three months Boer-Sedano was raped nine times by
the same police officer that had previously arrested him.175 The officer
would arrest Boer-Sedano, drive him to a dark location, and force him
to perform oral sex, threatening that he knew where Boer-Sedano lived
and worked and would reveal his homosexuality if he resisted. 76 The
officer would also make derogatory comments indicating that he was
targeting Boer-Sedano on account of his homosexuality.177 On one
occasion the officer "pulled out his hand gun and put a bullet in the
chamber and rolled the cylinder and put the gun to [Boer-Sedano's]
head and said 'if you're lucky this is going to be your fate.' ' 178
After three months, Boer-Sedano fled to Monterrey, Mexico, and
worked in an underground discotheque while applying for a visitor's
visa to the United States. Boer-Sedano secured a visitor's visa in April
1989 but remained in Mexico to save up funds for his relocation. In July
1989, the underground discotheque was raided by police who
questioned Boer-Sedano's sexual orientation. Fearing that he would
again be raped by police, Boer-Sedano began planning his escape from
Mexico. For the next year Boer-Sedano travelled to the United States to
buy goods to sell in Mexico, earning money to finance a new start in the
169. Id. at 1085.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1086.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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United States. In September of 1990, Boer-Sedano fled to San Francisco
and has not returned to Mexico since.179
In 1992 Boer-Sedano was diagnosed with HIV.180 He was at that
time working in the United States as a waiter and a busy boy at a hotel
which provided him with medical insurance that covered his AIDS
treatment.1 81 Over the course of his treatment Boer-Sedano developed
resistance to many common drug treatments and would soon need
"new anti-retroviral agents." 18 2
Boer-Sedano sought asylum, withholding, and protection under
CAT. Boer-Secado's claims were past persecution of rape and death
threats on account of his homosexuality, future persecution on account
of homosexuality, future persecution of employment discrimination
leading to an inability to obtain medication on account of
homosexuality and AIDS, as well as future persecution of a lack of
effective AIDS treatment. 83
The IJ found Boer-Sedano credible but denied Boer-Sedano's claims
holding that homosexuality was not a valid basis for a particular social
group and that the past persecution of rape and death threats were "a
personal problem" between Boer-Sedano and the police officer and not
persecution. 84 The claim of future persecution was discredited due to
Boer-Sedano's ability to live and work in Monterrey. The claims of
withholding and CAT were also denied.185 BIA affirmed the IJ's
decision without opinion.186
Before beginning its analysis, the court noted that it reviews the
factual findings of the BIA under the substantial evidence doctrine,
where the court may only overturn the BIA's decision when the
evidence is so compelling that "no reasonable factfinder could fail to
find that Petitioner has not established eligibility for asylum." 87 Also,
as the BIA affirmed without opinion, "the court may review the IJ's
decision as the final agency determination."18
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1087.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. (as there is no opinion by the BIA available to review).
[Vol. 33:2
0IV-Based Claims for Protection in the U.S. and the U.K.
In regards to Boer-Sedano's claim of past persecution of rape and
death threats on account of his homosexuality, the court held that
homosexuality was a valid basis for a particular social group and that
acts by a police officer are "the prototypical state actor for asylum
purposes."18 9 The harm of rape and death threats were held to easily
rise to the level of persecution.190
With Boer-Sedano's past persecution on account of homosexuality
established, Boer-Sedano enjoyed a presumption of future persecution
based also on homosexuality. The court noted three arguments that the
IJ presented rebutting this presumption. First, country conditions
indicated that discrimination against homosexuals was not so severe in
Mexico. Second, relocation was possible as it had been to Monterrey.
Third, Boer-Sedano's repeated trips back and forth between Mexico and
the United States undermine any claim of fear of persecution in Mexico.
In regards to the first claim, the court held that the government
failed to provide sufficient evidence to show a change in country
conditions. 191 The government had provided evidence that violence
against homosexuals was not so severe and was usually limited to
transvestites, which Boer-Sedano was not.192 However, the court noted
that Boer-Sedano provided numerous sources of evidence proving that
violence against homosexuals was not limited to transvestites, but
continued to be a serious problem for homosexuals in Mexico.193
In regards to relocation within Mexico, the court holds that the
government failed in proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
relocation was reasonable for Boer-Sedano.194 The government had
argued that Boer-Sedano had failed to prove that the persecution he
feared was country-wide, that relocation was unreasonable.1 95
However, the court noted that once Boer-Sedano had proved past
persecution, it was the government's burden to prove that relocation
was reasonable. 196  Also, the court noted that Boer-Sedano's
homosexuality and HIV-positive status would likely make it impossible
for him to find a job, thereby making it impossible to obtain necessary
189. Id. at 1088.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1089.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1090.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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medical treatment, thus rendering relocation unreasonable. 197
In regards to Boer-Sedano's return trips to Mexico, the court held
that Boer-Sedano's return trips did not in themselves rebut the
presumption of a well-founded fear in Mexico. 198 Return trips are but
one element of many in considering whether the presumption has been
rebutted.199 In this case, the court noted that "in light of the evidence of
continuing persecution of homosexuals in Mexico, no reasonable
factfinder could find that Boer-Sedano's return trips alone" rebut the
presumption of a well-founded fear.200
For the reasons above, the court found Boer-Sedano "statutorily
eligible for asylum and remand for an exercise of discretion." 201 As
Boer-Sedano's claim for withholding was not fully considered by the IJ
or BIA in their previous opinions, the court remands Boer-Sedano's
withholding claim to the BIA.20 2 Noting the strict requirements for
torture required by the CAT, the court held that the IJ was within its
discretion to deny Boer-Sedano's claim for CAT protection.203
B. The United Kingdom
The asylum and humanitarian protection process in the U.K. begins
with a substantive interview with a U.K. border agency officer. 20 4 This
first stage consists of two meetings resulting in a decision, appealable to
the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT).205 The AIT consists of a
one to three member panel which reviews cases on issues of law only. 206
The AIT's decisions were formerly appealed to the UK House of Lords,
which consisted of an appellate committee of five members of the
197. Id. at 1091.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1092.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. UK Border Agency, http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum/process
(substantive interview occurs during the first step of "screening") (last visited Feb. 19.
2010).
205. UK Border Agency, http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/asylum/outcomes/
unsuccessfulapplications/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
206. Asylum & Immigration Tribunal, http://www.ait.gov.uk/AboutUs/about
Us.htm (last visited Feb. 19. 2010). As of February 15, 2010, the AIT has been replaced
by the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. See http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/
ImmigrationAsylum/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
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House of Lords. However, starting October 1, 2009 the Supreme Court
of the United Kingdom assumed jurisdiction over all civil cases in the
U.K., including claims of asylum and humanitarian protection.207
The analysis in this note draws from cases by the AIT, the Court of
Appeal, the House of Lords, and the ECtHR. No records from initial
substantive interviews were found.20 8 Similarly, no cases from the
Supreme Court regarding HIV-related claims were found.2 9 The AIT's
reported database contained eight cases from 2002 to 2005 involving
claimants who brought HIV-based claims.210 All eight of these cases
involved Article 3 based claims of humanitarian protection which was
the issue appealed to the AIT. Many of these cases involved non-HIV-
related asylum claims at earlier stages which were denied and not
appealed to the AIT and were therefore not substantively discussed in
the AIT's decisions. No cases involving HIV-based asylum claims were
found.
Four cases involving HIV-based claims were found in the records
of the Court of Appeal, as available through Westlaw and Lexis. The
dates of these cases ranged from 2005 to 2008. Three of these cases were
denials of appeal from the AIT involving HIV-positive claimants
seeking Article 3 based humanitarian protection. The fourth case was a
remand clarifying the appropriate standard for Article 3 based claims of
humanitarian protection. However, the facts of the case were not
discussed and so the case is not included in the table below. Again, no
HIV-based asylum claims were found.
From the House of Lords only one case, N v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 31,
was found. N v. SSHD currently stands as the highest ruling in the U.K.
207. From House of Lords to Supreme Court, PARLIAMENT UK, July 23, 2009, http://news
.parliament.uk/2009/07/from-house-of-lords-to-supreme-court/ (last visited Feb. 19,
2010).
208. Similar to the United States, no records of initial substantive interviews are kept.
209. No cases were found via Westlaw, LexisNexis, nor through a search of the
Court's online database at http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/decidedcases/index
.html.
210. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal ("AIT") maintains a searchable database
of reported cases at http://www.ait.gov.uk/Public/SearchReported.aspx. These cases
represent only a part of the AIT's total caseload but are offered as representative of the
AIT's caselaw. The remainder of the AIT's cases are available as well at
http://www.ait.gov.uk/Public/Searchunreported.aspx but are not indexed or
searchable via key terms. These cases are searchable only by date, and were not
included in the analysis of this note. To reiterate, the AIT has been replaced by the
Immigration and Asylum Chamber (IAC). The AIT's website is still valid, but it is no
longer referred to. The AIT website refers the viewer to the new IAC website.
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regarding Article 3 based claims for humanitarian protection. Though
the case was appealed to the ECtHR in N v. UK, the ECtHR affirmed the
House of Lords decision. Therefore, the framework laid out in N v.
SSHD remains the law and is cited by subsequent cases and official U.K.
Border Agency guidance as the proper standard for Article 3 based
claims for humanitarian protection.21
From the ECtHR come the two cases of D v. UK and N v. UK.
These are the only two cases from the ECtHR concerning HIV based
immigration claims and represent the beginning and present state of
Article 3 based humanitarian protection claims in the ECtHR,
respectively. 212
Table 2 below charts the progression of these cases in chronological
order, highlighting the evolution of the factors required in Article 3
based claims for humanitarian protection from D v. UK to N v. UK to
new emerging factors. A summary of the current Article 3 standard,
how it got there, and where it's going lies below, with a more detailed
discussion of individual cases illustrating these trends following.
211. UK Border Agency Asylum Policy Instructions, European Convention on Human
Rights, at 16, available at http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/
documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicyinstructions/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2010).
212. Two other cases exist on the ECtHR's record involving HIV-based immigration
claims, Ahmed v. Sweden, 9886/05, and B.B. v. France, 30930/96. However both of
these cases were struck from the ECtHR's list of cases and did not reach a decision on
their merits.
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Table 2.
The Evolution
of Article 3
Based Claims in
the U.K.
-/ Present23
0 Not Present
- Not Discussed
D v. UK (1997)
Article 3 Factors Acknowledged by the ECtHR in 1.
Relevant Article 3 Factors as ver N. I
V/ V/ I/ Grante
d
UKIAT 03905 / -" Denied
(2002)
UKIAT 08004
(2003) Denied
UKIAT 00015 0 " V Denied(2003)
UKIAT 00018 & 0 0 / - Denied(2004) GDne
UKIAT 00096 ( 24/ V Denied
UKIAT 00262 & " '/ "/ -Denied(2004)
UKIAT 00267 0 "/ , / Denied(2004) 
UKIAT 00077 0 ,V /" / Denied(2005)
N v. SSHD
(2005) UKHL 0 V/ - Denied
31
ZT v. SSHD
(2005) EWCA 0 V V " " 0 Denied
1421
GS v. SSHD
(2006) EWCA V V V & Denied
198
BK v. SSHD
(2008) EWCA V V V V V & Denied
510
N v. UK(2008) & V V ] V - Denied
213 These symbols designate the presence of factors in each case and not the immigration
authorities' perspective as to their validity. For example, a case where a shortening of
life was likely yet held as irrelevant by the immigration authority would result in an
affirmative check mark. Negative marks denote instances where the immigration
authority noted the absence of the factor. Dashes represent instances where the factor
was not discussed.
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1. HIV-Based Article 3 Humanitarian Protection
As noted above, all HIV-based claims found were articulated as
Article 3 claims for humanitarian protection. From the ECHR, Article 3
states that "[no] one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." 214 The pertinent part for HIV-
based claims being "inhuman or degrading treatment." Though these
words are not ambiguous, their meaning as applied to HIV-based
Article 3 claims has evolved over time. The current framework for
Article 3 based humanitarian protection in the U.K. is laid out in N v.
SSHD as:
[W]hether the applicant's illness has reached such a critical stage (i.e.
he is dying) that it would be inhuman treatment to deprive him of the
care which he is currently receiving and send him home to an early
death unless there is care available to enable him to meet that fate with
dignity.215
The result is a framework that outlines two main considerations:
first, that the applicant is near death, and second that the applicant
would be unable to meet their death with dignity if removed. This
framework was recently affirmed by the ECtHR in N v. UK,216 and is
currently promulgated by the UK Border Agency as official guidance
for all medically related Article 3 claims.217
The near-death requirement has been interpreted strictly as a
present-tense condition. 218 Claimants who are currently healthy due to
medical care available in the U.K. but would soon die if removed do not
satisfy this requirement.219 Though the irony of this logic is not lost on
the courts, it has remained the law.2 0
214. ECHR, supra note 56, art. 3.
215. N v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 31, [2005] 2 AC 296, 69 (U.K.) (emphasis added).
216. N v. UK, [2008] ECHR 453 , 42 (affirming the holding in N v. SSHD that the
exceptional circumstances in D. v. UK which triggered the Article 3 violation was the
critical stage of the claimant's illness, as well as the lack of any food, shelter, or social
support upon return).
217. See generally European Convention on Human Rights Policy Instructions, supra
note 211.
218. UK Rwanda [2004] UKIAT 00262 (Eng.) (involving an HIV-positive Rwandan
woman with "extremely poor" health and no prospect of treatment in Rwanda who was
denied humanitarian protection, and the AIT held that the woman's current condition
was not so severe as to be "near death").
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., N v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 31, 49, 53 (Eng.) (As part of the majority
decision, Lord Hope noted that "(i)t appears to be somewhat disingenuous for the court
to concentrate on the applicant's state of health which, on a true analysis, is due entirely
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Whether care is available to enable a person to meet death with
dignity is measured on the basis of available medical treatment, and
familial and other social support.221 The threshold for available medical
treatment is very low. Treatment is deemed available so long as it exists
in the home country, regardless of financial limitations, 222 general
supply constraints,223 or actual effectiveness for the claimant.224 Indeed,
merely palliative treatment is sufficient to afford a person dignity in
death and deny an Article 3 based claim.225 The threshold for familial
and other social support is also very low. The existence of any family
regardless of their financial ability or emotional desire to provide
assistance is sufficient.226 Where clear animosity by the family is shown,
a claimant who is currently in stable condition is assumed to be able to
"develop private life relationships with others." 227 Whether such an
to the treatment whose continuation is so much at risk." Yet even after acknowledging
the more fundamental moral point, Lord Hope concludes with his hand forced by fear,
stating that to adopt a different standard would result in financial consequences too
great to bear. To consider the future likely death of a claimant as persuasive "would risk
drawing into the United Kingdom large numbers of people already suffering from HIV
in the hope that they too could remain here indefinitely .... This would result in a very
great and no doubt unquantifiable commitment of resources which it is, to say the least,
highly questionable the states parties to the convention would ever have agreed to.").
221. Supra note 61, at 15.
222. UK Rwanda [2004] UKIAT 00262 (Eng.) (involving an HIV-positive claimant
from Rwanda who introduced evidence that such low supply and high cost of HIV
medication would prevent claimant from actually obtaining treatment, even if costs
were drastically cut, but the tribunal held that Article 3 did not provide a guarantee for
"wholly free availability of ARV drugs," and denied remand).
223. See id.
224. See, e.g., Shereni v SSHD, [2006] EWCA (Civ) 198, 2006 WL 755451 (Eng.) (HIV-
positive claimant from Zimbabwe had already developed resistance to common retro-
viral medication and was currently taking specialty medication. Zimbabwe was shown
to have some HIV medication but none suitable for claimant. Court held that
availability of HIV treatment was sufficient to satisfy Article 3).
225. See, e.g., VP v. SSI-tD [2004] UKIAT 00267 (Eng.) (explaining that an HIV-positive
claimant from Vietnam showed that there was no HIV treatment available in Vietnam,
only palliative treatment, and removal would result in death without family or other
social support, so the AIT held that treatment center offering palliative treatment was
sufficient to satisfy obligations under Article 3).
226. Jamaica v. SSHD [2004] UKIAT 00096, available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/43fc2d620.html (explaining that a homosexual HIV-positive man from
Jamaica was thrown out of his home at the age of 17, and again by his aunt when she
learned of his homosexuality, and though claimant was able to show general hostility
towards homosexuals in Jamaica and that there were no family or friends who would
support him, the AIT held that there was no reason claimant could not make new
friends).
227. Id.
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individual would still be able to develop such relationships when
denied medical care and suffers a severe deterioration in health has not
yet been considered.
Two other arguments were often raised by claimants: that removal
would lead to a drastic shortening of their life, and that removal would
result in severe mental and physical suffering. This is due to the fact
that these two elements were present in D v. UK and were compelling
factors in the Court reaching its holding in that case. 228 D v. UK was a
landmark case, preceding N v. UK by over a decade, and first set the
stage for Article 3 based humanitarian protection claims related to
medical care.
The Court held in D v. UK that the claimant's near-death status
combined with a dramatic shortening of life, acute mental and physical
suffering, absolute lack of medical treatment or family or social support
if returned to St. Kitts constituted "exceptional circumstances" under
which "the decision to remove him to St. Kitts would amount to
inhuman treatment by the respondent State in violation of Article 3."229
Unfortunately, the Court declined to provide an exact account of
which of these factors were required, which optional, and if some were
optional how they were to be weighted. The next ten years would
reveal an ever constricting interpretation of D v. UK that continues to
the present day. At present neither a drastic shortening of life, nor
severe mental and physical suffering are relevant in Article 3 based
claims. While a dramatic shortening of life enjoyed some discussion
subsequent to D v. UK recent cases make clear that even a dramatic
shortening of life due to removal is no longer compelling. 230 Similarly,
where mental and physical suffering is mentioned at all it is mentioned
as a sad but unavoidable reality, not relevant to the analysis of an
Article 3 claim.231
228. See D v. UK, App. No. 30240/96, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 423, 51, 52 (1997) (noting
that as part of overall finding of exceptional circumstances, the abrupt withdrawal of
medical care would dramatically hasten claimants death), available at http://www.
unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46deb3452.html.
229. Id. 51-53.
230. See [2005] UKIAT 00077. An HIV-positive Ghanaian woman was suffering from
advanced case of AIDS, and "removal would reduce Appellant's life expectancy to
between 6 and 12 months, before an agonizing death." Id. 17. However, the Tribunal
held that shortening of life was not a relevant factor in Article 3 claims. See also N. v.
UK, [2008] ECHR 453, 42 (noting that "[t]he fact that the applicant's circumstances,
including his life expectancy, would be dramatically reduced if he were to be
removed.. is not sufficient in itself to give rise to a breach of Article 3").
231. See EWCA (Civ) 510 (noting that the claimant who will suffer extreme suffering
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Sadly, two recent cases seem to have introduced a new requirement
of uniqueness to the standard Article 3 analysis. Since D v. UK first
articulated Article 3 as involving "exceptional" circumstances, cases
have turned on what factors were in fact exceptional. 232 Through the
years it seems the original words of Article 3 itself have been forgotten
as these recent cases have reinterpreted the term "exceptional" as
requiring uniqueness. 233  Claimants who satisfy all the legal
requirements for Article 3 based humanitarian protection as established
by N v. SSHD, have been denied relief due to the fact that their
circumstances were not unique, but potentially shared by many in their
home country. 234 Though this interpretation has no support in the text
of Article 3 itself, nor in the currently promulgated standard set forth in
N v. SSHD, these cases have not yet been overturned.
a. D v. United Kingdom
Over a decade ago, D v. UK established new ground for Article 3
based humanitarian protection claims. The right of States to control
their borders and exclude those it wishes is as well established as the
existence of States themselves. Yet in granting D's Article 3 claim, the
ECtHR held that it would take seriously the absolute, non-derogable
nature of the rights established in the ECHR.
Unfortunately, despite D v. UK's groundbreaking nature few cases
would be able to repeat its success. Indeed, eight years later N v. SSHD
would virtually close the door to D v. UK type Article 3 based claims.
However, D v. UK itself remains good law and serves as the marker of
where these cases began.
Case Summary
D v. UK involved an HIV-positive man from St. Kitts, a small two-
island nation in the Caribbean. In August of 1994, D was serving time
in a British penitentiary when he suffered an attack of pnuemocystis
is the product of "a world where there is abject poverty and healthcare," a situation not
unique, thus denying humanitarian protection), [2008] EWCA (Civ) 198 (explaining
that the claimant will likely die soon after returning to home country, but as drugs are
available to alleviate pain of death, there was no Article 3 violation), [2004] UKIAT
00267 (explaining that there was no IIV/AIDS treatment available, but palliative
treatment was enough to satisfy Article 3).
232. See D. v. UK, App. No. 30240/96, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 423, 51-53.
233. See BK v. SSHD [2008] EWCA (Civ) 510 (2008 WL 2033428); ZT v. SSHD [2005]
EWCA (Civ) 1421 (2005 WL 3114462), 23.
234. BK v. SSHD [2008] EWCA (Civ) 510 (2008 WL 2033428).
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carinii pneumonia and was diagnosed as HIV-positive. 235 Having
entered the country without proper documentation, immigration
authorities had sought to remove D immediately after his release on
January 20, 1996.236 However, with the help of his solicitors, D
requested leave to remain in the U.K. on compassionate grounds.237
With few medical resources available in St. Kitts, it was argued that
removal would effectively deny D any chance of continuing the medical
treatment that was keeping him alive.238 D's request was denied, the
immigration authorities stating that it would be unfair to provide
treatment to D at public expense.239 On February 2, 1996 D applied to
the High Court for judicial review, and was denied. 240 On February 15,
1996 D again appealed - now to the Court of Appeal - and again was
denied.241 D then appealed his case to the ECtHR.242
By this time D's medical condition had deteriorated significantly. 243
His CD4 cell count had been below 10 for over a year and he was
suffering from "anaemia, bacterial chest infections, malaise, skin rashes,
weight loss and periods of extreme fatigue."244 D was "reaching the end
of the average durability of the effectiveness of the drug therapy which
he was receiving," and his life expectancy was estimated at eight to
twelve months.245 Without treatment it was estimated that D's life
expectancy would be reduced by half.246
A letter from the High Commission for the Eastern Caribbean
States stated that St. Kitts did not have the medical capacity to treat D's
HIV.247 A letter from the Red Cross stated that St. Kitts in fact had no
medical capacity to treat HIV or AIDS.248 As D's mother had already
emigrated to the U.K. to care for him, D had no home or family left in
235. D v. UK, 8.
236. Id. 10.
237. Id. 11.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. 12.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. 13.
244. Id.
245. Id. 15.
246. Id.
247. Id. 16.
248. Id. 17.
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St. Kitts.249
In its holding, the court first notes that all States generally have the
right to control the entry, residence, and expulsion of aliens.250
However, the court also notes that "in exercising their right to expel
such aliens Contracting States must have regard to Article 3 of the
Convention (art. 3) [which] prohibits in absolute terms torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." 251
Recognizing that Article 3 had in the past typically been applied to
persons facing risk of intentional acts perpetrated by public authorities,
the court held as follows:
[G]iven the fundamental importance of Article 3 in the Convention
system, the Court must reserve to itself sufficient flexibility to address
the application of that Article 3 in other contexts which might arise. It
is not therefore prevented from scrutinizing an applicant's claim under
Article 3 where the source of the risk of proscribed treatment in the receiving
country stems from factors which cannot engage either directly or indirectly
the responsibility of the public authorities of that country, or which, taken
alone do not in themselves infringe the standards of that Article 3. To limit
the application of Article 3 in this manner would be to undermine the
absolute character of its protection. 252
The court acknowledged that it was doing something new. It
recognized that though the various aspects of D's suffering are not the
intentional acts of any government, nor the indirect responsibility of
any public authority, nor even sufficient to infringe Article 3 if viewed
individually, taken as a whole they warrant a serious analysis and may
constitute an Article 3 violation.253
The court then held that D's near-death status combined with a
dramatic shortening of life, acute mental and physical suffering, and
absolute lack of medical treatment or family or social support if
returned to St. Kitts constituted "exceptional circumstances" under
which "the decision to remove him to St. Kitts would amount to
inhuman treatment by the respondent State in violation of Article 3."254
How many of these elements were necessary, or how they should be
weighted, the Court unfortunately did not say.
249. Id. T 18.
250. Id. 46.
251. Id. T 47.
252. Id. T 49 (emphasis added).
253. Id.
254. Id. 77 51- 53.
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b. VP v. SSHD
VP v. SSHD, [2004] UKIAT 000267, is representative of the cases
which occurred after D v. UK, but before N v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 31.
These cases were factually similar to D v. UK in all respects except that
the claimants were not in a near-death condition. It was on this crucial
difference that these cases were distinguished from D v. UK and were
denied. The claimant in this particular case had no family or social
support waiting for him in his home country, no prospect of medical
treatment, and would suffer a dramatic shortening of life if removed,
yet at the moment of adjudication enjoyed relative health due to the
medical treatment provided to him while in the U.K. On this basis, he
was denied protection.
Case Summary
This case involved a young HIV-positive man from Vietnam who
sought asylum and humanitarian protection under Article 3 of the
ECHR. 255 Denied both at the Adjudicator level, he appealed his case to
the AIT. 256
Though the claimant was HIV positive, at the time of the tribunal's
decision he had achieved "good control over his HIV disease." 25 7
Without treatment, however, the claimant's chances of survival over
three years was estimated to be 5%.258 With treatment the claimant's
chances of survival for three years was estimated at 95%.259 The
claimant had no known family in Vietnam or in the U.K.260 Evidence
was introduced of a HIV treatment center in Vietnam, the Binh Trieu
center in Ho Chi Minh City.261 This center was established as the only
care center available for AIDS patients in Vietnam.262 However, no
actual medical care was available at the center, only palliative care to
ease a patient's pain and suffering.263 In deciding the case, the AIT
turned to the standard laid out in N v. SSHD [2003] EWCA Civ 1369,
which stated that relief could be granted only when "Lit] is arguable that
255. VP v. SSHD [2004] UKIAT 00267, 1.
256. Id.
257. Id 4.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. 5.
262. Id.
263. Id.
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the humanitarian appeal of the case is so powerful that it cannot be
resisted by authorities of a civilized state." 264
The AIT held that the facts of this case did not satisfy the above
standard as they were less favorable than those in N v. SSHD [2003]
EWCA Civ 1369 where N enjoyed no available treatment centers. The
Tirbunal also distinguished VP's situation from the claimant in D v. UK.
Here, the claimant had some prospect for survival in the medium term
whereas D did not.265 For the aforementioned reasons, the AIT
dismissed the case.266
c. N v. Secretary of State for the Home Department
N v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 31 solidified the near-death requirement
that had been developed in recent cases. Though the Court in D v. UK
had noted that the claimant there was near death, it was only one of a
host of factors found in the aggregate to amount to an "exceptional"
circumstance, warranting humanitarian protection.267 By N v. SSHD
[2005] UKHL 31, it had become an essential factor without which no
Article 3 based claim could succeed.
As a case before the House of Lords there is no single majority
opinion, rather each of the five appellate committee members issues an
individual opinion. The holding is whatever consensus arises from
these opinions. In this case, the standard articulated by Lord Hope and
Baroness Hale, and accepted by Lord Brown, is accepted as the majority
holding and is promulgated by the UK Home Office as the test for
medical illness claims of Article 3 based humanitarian protection.268 As
noted above, the standard is essentially that the claimant is so close to
death that it would be inhuman to send him away, "unless there is care
available to enable him to meet that fate with dignity." 269
The cruel irony is that such a rule penalizes claimants for obtaining
the life saving treatment they seek to preserve with their claim. If an
HIV-positive claimant seeks medical care and maintains relative health
he will fail to satisfy the near-death requirement and be denied
protection. Even if a claimant arrives in the U.K. in a near-death
condition and is then eligible for protection, by the time the claimant is
264. Id. 1(citing N v. SSHD, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1369, 40).
265. Id. 6.
266. Id.
267. Supra note 232.
268. Supra note 54.
269. Supra note 215.
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before the AIT or Supreme Court their condition will likely have
stabilized rendering them subject to removal.
Case Summary
N v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 31 was a case involving a Ugandan
woman who had entered the U.K. on March 28, 1998.270 She had
entered with false documents but was seriously ill upon entry and was
taken to a hospital where she was diagnosed as HIV positive.271 By
August N had developed Kaposi's sarcoma - an AIDS defining illness
- and had a CD4 count of 10.272 A report issued by N's doctor stated
that "[w]ithout active treatment 'N's' prognosis is appalling. I would
anticipate her life expectancy to be under twelve months if she were
forced to return to Uganda, where there is no prospect of her getting
adequate therapy." 273
At the first adjudicator level, N brought claims of asylum and
protection under Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR. The adjudicator
dismissed N's claims of asylum and protection under article 8, but
found that N's case for Article 3 protection was "overwhelming." 274
The adjudicator noted existing policy guidance from the Home Office
regarding medical Article 3 claims, then still based on D. v. UK, which
advised that claimants who would suffer a shortening of life and acute
physical and medical suffering upon removal should be granted
protection.275 Having "no doubt that all the requirements of this
paragraph [referring to policy guidance on medical Article 3 claims]
have been met in this case .... I find that the implementation of the
respondent's decision to return the applicant to Uganda would be a
breach of her Article 3 rights." 276
The case was then appealed to the AIT where N's removal was
found acceptable. 277 The AIT found evidence of HIV treatment that was
becoming available in Uganda, and held such as sufficient grounds to
distinguish N's case from that of D. v. UK and thus not a violation of
270. N v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 31, 2.
271. Id. 3.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. 5.
275. N v. SSHD, [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1369, 11.
276. Id.
277. Id. 913, 21.
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Article 3.278 N argued that her growing resistance to basic anti-
retroviral medications rendered the potential treatment in Uganda
ineffective. 279 The AIT found that argument speculative in light of the
ever changing nature of HIV medication.280  N argued that the
treatment available in Uganda was prohibitively expensive and that she
would be unable to afford it.281 The AIT found that the relevant factor
was the availability of medical treatment, not its cost or effectiveness. 282
Accordingly, the AIT found that "for the respondent to be returned to
Uganda would not be a breach of Article 3."283
N then appealed her case to the Court of Appeal where she argued
that the AIT "failed to confront unimpeachable findings of fact made by
the Adjudicator in the appellant's favor." 2 4 The court agreed that the
AIT had provided lackluster legal reasoning in its decision, but held by
a majority that N's case would fail even if taken at its most positive, as it
did not satisfy the "extreme" requirements of Article 3. The court
dismissed N's case.285
N appealed again, now to the UK House of Lords.286 Lord Nicholls
of Birkenhead, Lord Hope of Craighead, Lord Walker of Gestinghorpe,
Baroness Hale of Richmond, and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
provided their opinions concerning the case. The majority held that the
requirements set by D v. UK for Article 3 protection were very
exceptional, requiring applicants to be near death with no prospect of
treatment or care if returned to their home country. An analysis of each
opinion follows.
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead noted in his opinion that the logic
underlying D v. UK was flawed. While the ECtHR held that D was
entitled to humanitarian protection due under Article 3 due to his
exceptional circumstances, in truth the circumstances of D's life were
not exceptional at all in comparison to the lives of many who suffer
from HIV and AIDS.287 In this respect, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead
278. Id. 20.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 21.
283. Id.
284. Id. 7.
285. Id. at 43, 49.
286. N v. SSHD, [2005] UKHL 31, 1.
287. Id. 12, 13.
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held that the humanitarian holding of D v. UK was simply unclear.
What was clear, however, was the ECtHR's holding in D v. UK that
States do not have a duty to pay for the medical care of illegal aliens,
which is what Lord Nicholls believed the focus of these cases should
be.288 Under this rationale, Lord Nicholls, joining with Lord Hope of
Craighead and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, expressed his
opinion to dismiss the appeal.28 9
Lord Walker of Gestinghorpe, in a one paragraph opinion, stated
his agreement with the aforementioned opinion and stated that the
applicant's circumstances were not exceptional and the appeal should
be dismissed. 290
Baroness Hale of Richmond noted that not even the ECtHR itself
had, since D v. UK, granted Article 3 in a number of other medically
related cases, even in circumstances arguably more dire than that in D
v. UK.291 In this respect, Baroness Hale of Richmond suggested that
perhaps the ECtHR had recognized that it had been overgenerous in D
v. UK and had since been undertaking to quietly correct its past
mistake.292 In regards to the core issue of the case the Baroness stated
that the test should be:
whether the applicant's illness has reached such a critical stage (i.e. he
is dying) that it would be inhuman treatment to deprive him of the
care which he is currently receiving and send him home to an early
death unless there is care available there to enable him to meet that
fate with dignity.293
Baroness Hale acknowledged that this test is effectively the same as
that of Lord Hope of Craighead.294 Under this test, Baroness Hale held
that the applicant failed to establish a claim for Article 3 protection and
that the appeal should be dismissed.295
Lord Hope of Craighead expressed his opinion that the proper test
for Article 3 medical cases should be whether "the applicant's medical
condition had reached such a critical stage that there were compelling
humanitarian grounds for not removing him to a place which lacked
288. Id. 15.
289. Id. 19.
290. Id. 55.
291. Id. 65-70.
292. Id. 63.
293. Id. 69.
294. Id.
295. Id. 70.
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the medical and social services which he would need to prevent acute
suffering while he is dying."296
Similar to Baroness Hale, Lord Hope acknowledged that this
standard was effectively the same as that of the Baroness'. Under this
standard, Lord Hope held that the applicant's currently stable condition
allowed for removal without violating Article 3.297
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood noted, at great length, the
internal debate and subsequent discussion at the ECtHR concerning the
impact and future role of D v. UK.298 Lord Brown's conclusion was that
the ECtHR had come to adopt a "restrictive line" to the case which
limited its holding, as opposed to a "liberal line" which may have
established an absolute right of medical care for seriously ill persons. 299
With this understanding in mind, Lord Brown accepted Lord Hope of
Craighead's test and similarly concluded that the applicant did not
satisfy the requirements for Article 3 protection.3 00
d. BK v. SSHD
In the wake of N v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 31, a further restriction
appeared on Article 3 based claims-the requirement of uniqueness. As
noted above, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead stated in his opinion in that
case that the logic of the ECtHR in its reasoning in D v. UK was flawed.
Specifically, Lord Nicholls argued that while the ECtHR had stated that
D's situation warranted protection due to D's exceptional
circumstances, in fact D's circumstances were quite similar to many
others who suffer from HIV in the underdeveloped and developing
world.301  In doing so, Lord Nicholls introduced the concept of
uniqueness to the existing definition of "exceptional" as required by D
v. UK. Though not a part of the commonly cited majority, Lord
Nicholls's opinion still stands part of the House of Lord's ruling, and
296. Id. 50.
297. Id. 51.
298. Id. 7 80-89.
299. Id. 89.
300. Id. T 97-98. N subsequently appealed her case to the ECtHR where it was
heard by a Grand Chamber of 17 Judges, fourteen of whom affirmed the holding in N v.
SSHD [2005] UKHL 31 for largely the same reasons as the House of Lords. Judges
Tulkens, Bonello, and Spielmann dissented, arguing that the protections secured by the
ECHR were non-derogable, and had previously been held as such by the Court even in
the face of social or economic hardship. To excuse the protection of an ECHR right out
of fear of economic cost would undermine the authority of the ECHR itself.
301. N v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 31, 1.
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thus the requirement of uniqueness was born.
Later that same year this new requirement for uniqueness arose
again in ZT v. SSHD [2005] EWCA 1421, where the Court of Appeal was
considering an appeal from the AIT involving a humanitarian
protection claim denied to a Zimbabwean woman. It was there that the
Court introduced a new requirement based on the plain meaning of
"exceptional." The Court noted the following:
It is only fair to the IAT302 to remind ourselves that they were at least in
part addressing an exorbitant submission on behalf of Ms. ZT that her case
was unique. The unreality of that contention was demonstrated by the
very large numbers suffering from HIV in Zimbabwe.... Once she had
failed to demonstrate any significant difference between the position
in Zimbabwe and that in other countries, then it was relevant to
consider whether she would be in a different position from other
AIDS sufferers in Zimbabwe. No attempt was made to demonstrate
such a difference to the IAT, as they were correct to record.303
In April of 2008 BK v. SSHD [2008] EWCA Civ 510 involved a
claimant whose circumstances fulfilled all the legal requirements of an
Article 3 claim set out in N v. SSHD [2005] UKHL 31, yet the court
denied his claim specifically due to the lack of uniqueness of the
claimant's situation.304
Case Summary
BK v. SSHD involved an HIV-positive Zimbabwean man seeking
protection under asylum and humanitarian protection.305 BK entered
the U.K. in 1999 and remained illegally.306 In 2002 BK was diagnosed
302. The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal is sometimes referred to as the
Immigration and Asylum Tribunal, abbreviated as IAT. They are the same government
entity. As of February 2010, the IAT was superseded by the First-tier Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber (FTMAC). Tribunals Service, Immigration and
Asylum, http://www.tribunals.gov.uk/ImmigrationAsylum/AboutUs/AboutUs.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2010).
303. ZT v. SSHD, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1421, 23 (emphasis added).
304. BK v. SSHD, [2008] EWCA (Civ) 510. It must be noted at this point that neither
the text of the ECHR itself, nor the ECtHR in D. v. UK or N. v. UK, contain any
consideration of uniqueness in their discussion of Article 3-based claims. The term
"exceptional" was first coined by the ECtHR in D. v. UK as a means of classifying the
severity of harm that would constitute "inhuman or degrading treatment," as defined
by Article 3 itself. By re-interpreting the term "exceptional" outside of this context, the
UK has bastardized the term and its analysis of Article 3 based claims.
305. Id. 1.
306. Id.
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with HIV and began various treatment regimens. 307 In 2004 BK applied
for asylum on the grounds that he would be persecuted on account of
past affiliation with the MDC political party in Zimbabwe, and
humanitarian protection on the grounds that his removal would deny
him life saving medical treatment violating Articles 3 and 8 of the
ECHR.308
The Adjudicator denied both of BK's claims due to a lack of
credibility.309 However, an appeal was granted on the grounds that the
Adjudicator had misunderstood some of BK's evidence concerning the
availability of treatment for HIV in Zimbabwe.310
BK provided expert testimony that HIV treatment would be
impossible for him to obtain due to reasons of cost, availability, and
accessibility. 311 BK also provided evidence as to the mental and
physical anguish he would suffer due to a lack of medication, including
those from AIDS defining illnesses such as TB, acute pneumonia,
blindness and mental confusion. 312
The Adjudicator held that though he was aware that BK
will die and in the most appalling circumstances of pain, indignity
and in all likelihood confused terror ... no one with any sense of
human decency could help feeling pity for him in his circumstances
and revulsion at his possible plight .... [Sladly there are a very large
number of people in Zimbabwe and in the world at large that do face this fate.
It is a consequence of living in a world where there is abject poverty
and poor healthcare. 313
Finding that "[i]t is the poor healthcare in Zimbabwe that is the
problem," the Adjudicator dismissed BK's appeal under Article 3.314
On appeal to the AIT, BK raised numerous objections centered
around the Adjudicator's failure to understand the severity of the harm
BK would incur if removed to Zimbabwe. The AIT dismissed all of
these claims, noting that the Adjudicator
was as alive as I am to the horrific nature of this case. A tragedy of
truly epic proportions has struck Saharan Africa. Approximately 25%
307. Id.
308. Id. 2.
309. Id.
310. Id. 3.
311. Id. 5.
312. Id.
313. Id (emphasis added).
314. Id.
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of the population of Zimbabwe suffers from HIV AIDS .... Sadly the
plight of the appellant is far from unusual. The case law makes it clear
that it is only in an exceptional and extreme case that a claim will
succeed under Article 3 or 8.315
For the reasons above, the AIT dismissed BK's appeal.
IV. Conclusion
The current application of asylum and refugee law in both the U.S.
and the U.K. offers limited protection to persons with HIV. In the
United States, asylum's unique requirement of proving the persecutor's
motivation severely limits a claimant's case. Similarly, the U.K.'s
requirement that a claimant be near death and that their suffering be
unique effectively bars all Article 3 based claims for humanitarian
protection. Both of these interpretations are arguably incorrect,
aberrations from the norm created due to financial and social fears.
They represent a step back from the belief that those who suffer without
just cause should be protected. Fortunately, they can be changed; there
is something we can do.
315. Id. 17 (emphasis added).
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